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Abstract 
The paper attempts to establish a few stylised facts about Euroland's labour market given the 
increasing importance of smoothly functioning markets in the EMU. We assemble 
econometric evidence regarding labour demand behaviour, wage-setting mechanisms and 
the cyclicality of unemployment in Euroland. We find that in the 1990s unemployment 
cyclicality has been higher in Euroland than in the US, while the opposite was true in the 
previous two decades. The main reason for this is to be found in Euroland's employment now 
responding much stronger to cyclical fluctuations in output than in the past, and even 
somewhat stronger than in the US. Thus, it appears rather implausible that overall too strict 
employment protection regulations can still offer a convincing explanation for a significant 
part of Euroland's problem of persistently high unemployment. There can be little doubt, 
however, that wage-bargaining in Euroland continues to suffer from a serious insider-outsider 
problem. 
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I. Introduction 
To the extent that relatively low employment rates and persistently high unemployment rates 
indicate a malfunctioning of labour markets, EMU has entered its third stage in a situation in 
which labour market mechanisms still need to be improved considerably in order to expand 
employment opportunities and to reduce structural unemployment. This paper analyses a few 
key labour market mechanisms in Euroland with some focus on the impact EMU might have 
on labour market mechanisms and, conversely, the risks emanating from labour markets that 
are still generally hampered by numerous structural problems. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section II we set the stage by summarising briefly the 
main arguments for the increasing importance of labour market flexibility in EMU. Section III 
attempts to establish a few stylised facts about labour market(s) mechanisms in Euroland by 
providing empirical evidence regarding aggregate labour demand, wage bargaining behav-
iour and the cyclicality of unemployment in the euro area. Section IV recapitulates our main 
findings and draws a few policy conclusions. 
II. EMU and the Labour Market(s) 
EMU delivers a number of benefits. The single currency puts an end to exchange rate un-
certainty on trading decisions among its member countries. This should also reduce interest 
rate risk premia and, thus, borrowing costs in many countries. Furthermore, conversion costs 
arising from the use of separate national currencies are eliminated. Together with the sharp-
ened price transparency, the efficiency of the Single Market will be greatly enhanced by 
increased competition and greater specialisation and trade within the euro-zone and, last not 
least, by more integrated European financial markets (European Commission 1996). 
Against these benefits, which are likely to accumulate over time, the main potential cost of 
EMU is the loss of independence in monetary policy and, by implication, the use of the nomi-
nal exchange rate as a means to alter relative prices between countries. Clearly, the signifi-
cance of this loss depends on the degree to which this instrument would be used 
(considering that a number of the Member States belonged to the de facto DM-zone), on the 
likelihood of country-specific shocks that call for an adjustment of real exchange rates and on 
the efficiency of alternative adjustment mechanisms to country-specific economic distur-
bances. Regarding the latter, fiscal stabilisation policies are, of course, an important instru-
ment in accommodating temporary adverse demand developments, but, in general, swift 
absorption of macroeconomic shocks depends on well-functioning markets for goods and 
services and factors of production. 
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EMU, however, can be expected to exert a profound impact on the market participants. In 
particular, it will affect the price setting and wage bargaining behaviour of economic agents in 
a macro-economic environment characterised by a single, stability-oriented monetary policy 
and sound national fiscal policies in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact designed to avoid any conflict with monetary policy (Buti and Sapir 
1998). 
The introduction of a single currency is bound to increase the degree of competition in 
product and service markets by enhancing price transparency across EMU Member States. 
Thus, EMU provides an additional impetus to already ongoing efforts in the context of the 
Single Market Programme to improve the functioning of product and service markets, the 
necessity of which is highlighted by the empirical observation that average mark-ups in the 
Community are significantly higher than in the US (European Commission 1999). More com-
petitive product and service markets will help to achieve better labour market outcomes, in 
particular when accompanied by appropriate labour market reforms. Fiercer competition is 
likely to be associated with a higher level of job turnover; thus, the full gains of better func-
tioning product and service markets will only materialise if sufficiently flexible labour markets 
allow for a relatively smooth and swift reallocation of labour.  
EMU will also provide improved framework conditions for employment-compatible wage bar-
gaining behaviour as the link between wage and employment trends will become more evi-
dent and stringent. With the bailout option of nominal exchange rate devaluation no longer 
existing, any substantial error in wage setting would quickly translate into deteriorating labour 
market conditions. In EMU it is therefore even more important than in the past for wage 
developments to be in line with the macro-economic framework set at the Community level, 
in particular by the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (European Commission 1998) and the 
European Central Bank in its pursuit of price stability. 
The responsibility for wage setting procedures and outcomes compatible with the achieve-
ment and maintenance of high employment continues to fall primarily in the domain of the 
social partners. As indicated above, inappropriate wage developments – or, more generally 
speaking, inadequate labour market structures – in specific countries or regions, particularly 
when they are big enough to require an offsetting monetary policy response, may have 
harmful consequences for other members of EMU as well, thus re-enforcing the case for 
strengthened economic policy co-ordination. 
Given the overall stability orientation in EMU, the likelihood of country-specific economic dis-
turbances will be reduced; nevertheless, the efficient operation of remaining adjustment 
channels like fiscal policy and a flexible response of markets, including the labour market, 
has to be ensured, if adjustment to country-specific shocks through recession and higher 
unemployment is to be avoided.  
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In case of temporary adverse demand developments, the burden on wage adjustment can to 
some extent be mitigated by fiscal policy temporarily allowing the budget deficit to run high 
due to the effect of automatic fiscal stabilisers. In principle, the effectiveness of fiscal stabili-
sation policies may even be higher now, since negative spill-over effects between monetary 
and fiscal policies appear to be attenuated in EMU. Despite significant progress in recent 
years, however, in many countries public finances have not yet regained the full room for 
manoeuvre in accordance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact to help cushion 
the negative demand impact for an interim period. 
Fiscal stabilisation policies are apparently less adequate in case of a more permanent nega-
tive supply shock calling for an adjustment in real wages. However, resistance to real wage 
adjustment might be reduced, when fiscal policies assist to spread the necessary decline in 
real income more evenly across the population, thus not putting the adjustment burden 
entirely on wage earners. Fiscal policy may also play an important role if addressed at im-
proving productivity through incentives for restructuring and increased public investment in 
infrastructure and human capital formation.  
In general, however, smooth shock-absorption will require a flexible wage formation process. 
Without this flexibility, the necessary adjustment will be through employment levels. The 
available country-specific empirical evidence suggests that while long-run real wage flexibility 
in most EU countries more or less matches US levels, the speed of adjustment has been 
significantly lower in continental Europe (OECD 1994). Thus, short-run costs in terms of out-
put, job losses and unemployment are increased. Moreover, these negative sequels run the 
risk of persisting through time, since unemployment may breed unemployment, mainly by 
diminishing the effectiveness of the (long-term) unemployed as job seekers in the market. 
Thus, the case for active labour market policies to upgrade skills, to facilitate reintegration of 
the unemployed and to increase labour supply is considerably strengthened. 
Quantity adjustment to shocks may also occur in form of labour mobility. However, 
(geographical) labour mobility and intra-area migration flows are low in Europe compared to 
the US. The number of EU nationals resident in another Member State is only 5.5 million, 
equivalent to 1 ½ per cent of the EU population. Intra-country mobility is also low in most euro-
area countries; immigration and emigration rates (at the NUTS 1 level) average about 0.5 per 
cent of the regional population in Italy and Spain; in the Netherlands and Germany, at the 
other end of the spectrum, migration rates are almost three times as high, but nonetheless, 
still considerably lower than in the US or Australia (EUROSTAT 1995, OECD 1999a). EMU 
can be expected to foster labour mobility facilitated by economic integration and the Single 
Market Programme, but it seems unlikely that geographical labour mobility will increase 
greatly within the euro-zone. 
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Even without large-scale migration of labour, however, labour mobility continues to play an 
important role in the continuous job turnover process associated with perpetual structural 
change. Given the increasing need to re-allocate resources across sectors and regions, 
emphasis should be placed on efficient benefit systems and mobility enhancing active labour 
market programmes rather than costly job protection regulations. Indeed, in a number of EU 
countries regulations on employment contracts have been significantly eased, in particular on 
so-called "atypical" employment contracts such as part-time jobs and temporary work (OECD 
1999b). Given the current sustained strict employment protection regulation on regular con-
tracts, there have been additional incentives to switch from permanent contracts to more 
flexible work arrangements. While this may have helped to achieve the required workforce 
flexibility in otherwise still fairly rigid labour markets, it may have also led to a more seg-
mented labour market in which those with permanent contracts benefit both from 
employment protection legislation and from increased bargaining power by virtue of a 
growing number of workers in "atypical" forms of employment. 
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III. A Few Stylised Facts about Euroland's Labour 
Market 
This section attempts to establish some stylised facts with respect to labour demand behav-
iour, wage-setting mechanisms and the cyclicality of unemployment in Euroland. In part 1 a 
simple equation for aggregate labour demand is specified and estimated on a consistent 
OECD macroeconomic data set for the euro area. Part 2 makes use of a standard wage bar-
gaining framework to derive a fairly parsimonious specification to capture the movement of 
aggregate gross product wages per worker and to reconsider the evolution of the share of 
wages in nominal output. Finally, part 3 looks at the responsiveness of employment and the 
labour force to cyclical conditions in Euroland and provides an empirical assessment of 
Okun's law for the euro area. A special emphasis is put on possibly detecting shifts in struc-
tural parameters in the recent past, which would be indicative of a change in behavioural 
relations. 
III.1 A Simple Labour Demand Equation for Euroland 
The purpose of this section is to characterise aggregate labour demand behaviour in Euro-
land by estimating three key parameters of a fairly conventional structural labour demand 
equation. The parameters of interest are the speed of employment adjustment, the real wage 
elasticity of labour demand, and an estimate for trend growth in labour productivity in the euro 
area. The analytical tool used is an inverted production function approach, with optimal factor 
demand equations being derived from cost minimisation subject to a production function con-
straint. 
For a standard CES-type production function optimal labour demand N* under cost minimi-
sation is given by 
(1)  N* = A . GDP .(W/P)-µ. e-g T 
where N* denotes optimal employment, A is a scaling parameter, GDP is output in volume 
terms, W/P is gross wages per worker deflated by output prices, µ is the real wage elasticity 
of labour demand, and g represents exogenous technical progress. Assuming that employ-
ment does not adjust instantaneously to its optimal level, we may think of a partial adjustment 
process in the form  
(2) (N / N-1) =  (N
*
 / N-1)
S                           with  0 < s < 1  
where N is actual employment and the partial adjustment parameter s denotes the speed of 
adjustment. Substituting (1) into (2) and taking logarithms yields 
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(3)  log (N / N-1) = s log A  +  s log (GDP/N)t-1  -  s. µ log (W/P)  - s. g T 
which can be estimated straightforward by OLS. In order to account for a structural break in 
trend productivity growth, we allow for different time trends running up to 1974 and from 1975 
onwards. Finally, for a rough check on parameter stability over time, we also estimate the 
labour demand equation over the restricted time period of the past ten years, i.e. 1989-1998. 
The data set used throughout this chapter is the one as compiled by the OECD Secretariat 
for the euro area as a whole. Eurostat and the ECB already produce certain statistics for the 
euro area, but these are available only for a relatively short period and, so far, have only 
limited coverage; whereas the OECD provides a quite complete and consistent macro-
economic data set of the euro area. Value and volume series for Euroland are calculated as 
weighted averages of the eleven countries series using previous period value levels con-
verted in a common currency as weights. This calculation method is applied to growth rates. 
Corresponding level series are constructed on the basis of these calculated average growth 
rates and corresponding 1999 values, calculated as the sum of in euros converted values of 
the 11 member countries. Aggregate potential output is based on weighting potential output 
growth rates of the 11 euro area countries with moving weights based on exchange rates and 
local currency GDP value levels in the previous period. The output gap is then simply defined 
as the percentage deviation of actual real GDP from potential real GDP. Price series are 
obtained by dividing the value series by the volume series. The euro area unemployment rate 
is calculated on the basis of the unemployment data of the 11 countries according to the 
OECD commonly used definitions. Therefore, it differs from the rate published by Eurostat 
based on standardised unemployment data. 
The estimation results for an Euroland aggregate labour demand equation are presented in 
Tables 1-3. Table 1 shows the results of OLS estimation of equation (3) over the period 1970 
to 1998. The speed of employment adjustment is estimated at 0.54, thus on average slightly 
more than one half of the employment adjustment towards its optimal value has taken place 
within a year. The point estimate for the real wage elasticity of labour demand suggests that 
for a one per cent increase in real product wages labour demand will drop, ceteris paribus, by 
0.41 per cent. The estimate for trend technical progress conforms by and large with expected 
patterns, exhibiting a significant slowdown after 1974. It may be interesting to note, however, 
that the estimate for exogenous technical progress suggests an average growth rate of only 
about 1.3 per cent in the period after 1974, while observed labour productivity increased on 
average by 1.8 per cent over this time horizon, implying that part of labour productivity growth 
has been induced by relative factor price movements. 
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Table 1: Labour Demand Equation Euroland (OLS) 
     List of Variables in the Equation 
 
       ET              Employment total, in mill.                             
       Var1            LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>), Adjustment GDP volume               
       Var2            LN(WSSE/PGDP), Real Product Wages                      
       T-74            Timetrend before 1974                                  
       T75-            Timetrend  after  1974                                 
       D91             DUMMY 1991=1, German reunification                     
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
 
 
       Time Range for Estimation:  1970    – 1998    
 
 
  =========================================================================== 
  Dep. Variable:  LN(ET/ET<1>)                    I R2  0.855 I R2C  0.823 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I Var1                          I    0.53836 I   0.11669 I  4.61 I 46.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I Var2                          I   -0.21852 I   0.06915 I  3.16 I 15.7 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I T-74                          I   -0.01065 I   0.00442 I  2.41 I  5.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I T75-                          I   -0.00696 I   0.00165 I  4.22 I 28.1 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I D91                           I    0.05319 I   0.00846 I  6.29 I  5.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I CONST                         I   -2.18403 I   0.48455 I  4.51 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00679  I  MAPE     55.56  I            I DW  1.799 I RHO(1)  0.08 
 ============================================================================ 
 
 Estimates of structural parameters: 
 
 Speed of employment adjustment    0.54 
 Real wage elasticity of labour demand  -0.41 
 Trend growth of technical progress 
     Until 1974    2.0 
      After 1974     1.3 
 
Table 2 shows the result of replacing real product wages by its one-period lagged level, but 
this exercise yields more or less the same parameter estimates and all the qualitative conclu-
sions remain unaffected. Finally, the equation has been re-estimated over the period from 
1989 to 1998, with the results displayed in Table 3. When the labour demand equation is esti-
mated over the past ten years only, the speed of employment adjustment appears to have 
been somewhat faster in the past decade than in the 1970s and 1980s, while the other 
structural parameters in this simple labour demand equation have apparently remained more 
or less unchanged. 
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Table 2: Labour Demand Equation Euroland – Alternative Specification 
  List of Variables in the Equation 
 
       ET              Employment total, in mill.                             
       Var1            LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>), Adjustment GDP volume               
       Var2            LN(WSSE/PGDP), Real Product Wages <LAG 1>              
       T-74            Timetrend before 1974                                  
       T75-            Timetrend  after  1974                                 
       D91             DUMMY 1991=1, German reunification                     
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
   
       Time Range for Estimation:  1970    – 1998    
 
 ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  LN(ET/ET<1>)                    I R2  0.860 I R2C  0.830 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I Var1                          I    0.60792 I   0.12675 I  4.80 I 45.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I Var2                          I   -0.20071 I   0.05968 I  3.36 I 14.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I T-74                          I   -0.01326 I   0.00417 I  3.18 I  5.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I T75-                          I   -0.00818 I   0.00176 I  4.64 I 29.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I D91                           I    0.05863 I   0.00757 I  7.74 I  4.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I CONST                         I   -2.39076 I   0.51264 I  4.66 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00666  I  MAPE     53.47  I            I DW  1.680 I RHO(1)  0.14 
 ============================================================================ 
   
 Estimates of structural parameters: 
 Speed of employment adjustment    0.61 
 Real wage elasticity of labour demand  -0.33 
 Trend growth of technical progress 
      Until 1974   2.2 
       After 1974   1.3 
 
Table 3: Labour Demand Equation Euroland: 1989–1998 
Time Range for Estimation:  1989    – 1998    
============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  LN(ET/ET<1>)                    I R2  0.969 I R2C  0.943 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I Var1                          I    0.79849 I   0.15100 I  5.29 I 40.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I Var2                          I   -0.28487 I   0.50606 I  0.56 I  9.7 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I TREND                         I   -0.00973 I   0.00477 I  2.04 I 33.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I D91                           I    0.04724 I   0.01751 I  2.70 I 16.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I CONST                         I   -3.27327 I   0.97456 I  3.36 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00632  I  MAPE     12.45  I            I DW  2.686 I RHO(1) -0.35 
 ============================================================================ 
 
Estimates of structural parameters: 
 Speed of employment adjustment   0.80 
 Real wage elasticity of labour demand -0.36 
 Trend growth of technical progress    1.2 
I H S — Hofer, Pichelmann / Employment and Wage Adjustments in Euroland's Market — 9 
Summing up, according to the above estimation results labour demand behaviour in 
Euroland exhibits the following stylised features:  
· The real wage elasticity of labour demand is estimated at between –0.3 to –0.4; thus, a 
one per cent decrease in real product wages increases, ceteris paribus, employment 
demand by 0.3–0.4 per cent. 
· The speed of employment adjustment has apparently increased in the past decade to 
around 80 % of adjustment being achieved in one year, up by some 25 percentage points 
from its average value over the past three decades.  
· Autonomous technical progress is estimated to have averaged 1.2–1.3 per cent per year 
in the period since 1975, a value which falls significantly short of the trend growth rate of 
actual labour productivity amounting to 1.8 per cent in this time span. 
III.2 A Simple Wage Equation for Euroland 
In this section, an aggregate wage equation is set up which can be derived from a standard 
wage bargaining model or, alternatively, from efficiency wage considerations. In this context, 
the key parameters of interest are the degree of real wage rigidity and the speed of adjust-
ment in wages to a shock.  
We start from a fairly general specification for wage behaviour which relates the growth of 
gross product wages per employee to product price inflation measured via the GDP deflator, 
labour productivity growth and unemployment. An almost unrestricted estimate of such a 
relation is given in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Aggregate Wage Equation Euroland (OLS) 
        List of Variables in the Equation 
   
       WSSE            Gross wages per employee, in 1000 euros                
       PGDP            GDP deflator, 1999=100                                 
       Var1            LN(WSSE<1>/PGDP<1>), Real product wages lag 1          
       Var2            LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>), Labour productivity lag 1           
       Var3            LN(GDPV/ET)-LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>)                          
       UR              unemployment rate euroland oecd                        
       D91             DUMMY 1991=1, German reunification                     
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
   
        Time Range for Estimation:  1970    – 1998    
    
 ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  LN(WSSE/WSSE<1>)                I R2  0.987 I R2C  0.983 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I LN(PGDP/PGDP<1>)              I    1.17580 I   0.14619 I  8.04 I 23.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I Var1                          I   -0.22591 I   0.05686 I  3.97 I 24.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I Var2                          I    0.18713 I   0.05451 I  3.43 I 21.7 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I Var3                          I    0.47184 I   0.13941 I  3.38 I  4.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I UR                            I    0.00390 I   0.00205 I  1.90 I  9.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I UR<1>                         I   -0.00544 I   0.00231 I  2.35 I 13.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B7 I D91                           I   -0.01730 I   0.00914 I  1.89 I  2.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B8 I CONST                         I   -1.02807 I   0.29627 I  3.47 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00565  I  MAPE      7.06  I            I DW  1.929 I RHO(1) -0.03 
 ============================================================================ 
 
        General F-Test        H0: B1=1, B2+B3=0 
        H1: Restrictions under H0 are not valid 
 
                  OLS-coefficient      Restricted  OLS 
                      Estimates            Estimates 
 
             B1         1.17580              1.00000 
             B2        -0.22591             -0.16213 
             B3         0.18713              0.16213 
             B4         0.47184              0.46299 
             B5         0.00390              0.00321 
             B6        -0.00544             -0.00749 
             B7        -0.01730             -0.02095 
             B8        -1.02807             -0.80598 
 
             Value of Test-Statistic:      1.486 
             Under H0: F( 2, 21) 
      Prob value: 24.92% 
 
The results suggest that product price inflation enters the equation with a unitary coefficient; 
thus, the equation can be reduced to a real product wage relation. Furthermore, the coeffi-
cients on lagged real wages and lagged labour productivity are of opposite sign, but of the 
same order of magnitude; thus, we arrive at a nice error correction model whereby in the long 
run the share of wages is related to the unemployment rate. Note, finally, that the impact 
effect of unemployment could not be correctly established by pointing to a high degree of 
short-run real wage rigidity. 
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Table 5 gives the result of re-estimating the equation in the form of an error-correction model 
for real gross product wages per worker. Additionally, the insignificant term for contem-
poraneous unemployment has been removed from the equation. The estimation results again 
confirm what is by now a well-established stylised fact of wage behaviour in most of conti-
nental Europe, namely a very slow adjustment of wages to shocks as indicated by the quite 
low coefficient on the error correction term. Taken at face value the estimate would suggest 
that it takes 4.4 years in Euroland to complete half of the adjustment. In the (very) long run, 
though, real product wages do appear to be highly sensitive to unemployment with the long-
run effect estimated at around –3.  
Table 5: Aggregate Real Product Wage Equation (OLS) 
        List of Variables in the Equation 
 
       Var1            LN(WSSE/WSSE<1>)-LN(PGDP/PGDP<1>)            
       Var2            LN(GDPV/ET)-LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>)                
       ECWE            Error correction term, wage share lag 1  
       D91             DUMMY 1991=1, German reunification           
       UR              unemployment rate euroland oecd              
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                
 
       Time Range for Estimation:  1970    – 1998    
 
 ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  Var1                            I R2  0.922 I R2C  0.909 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I Var2                          I    0.40524 I   0.11225 I  3.61 I 18.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I ECWE                          I   -0.14507 I   0.02946 I  4.92 I 19.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I D91                           I   -0.02395 I   0.00876 I  2.73 I 13.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I UR<1>                         I   -0.00438 I   0.00037 I 11.75 I 48.1 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I CONST                         I   -0.71368 I   0.15226 I  4.69 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00594  I  MAPE     50.53  I            I DW  1.610 I RHO(1)  0.10 
 ============================================================================ 
 
Despite some efforts to detect a change in structural parameters of the wage equation over 
time, mainly by introducing both shift and trend dummy variables to capture possible changes 
in either the adjustment speed parameter or the coefficient measuring real wage rigidity, 
there seems to be little evidence of significant modifications in wage determination behaviour 
in Euroland. Table 6 shows one of the more interesting results from these exercises, where a 
linear change in the real wage rigidity parameter has been allowed for over the period of the 
past three years. It appears that long-run real wage rigidity may have declined somewhat 
further in the recent past, but the significance of this result is certainly not very pronounced. 
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Table 6: Real Product Wage Equation Euroland – Alternative Specification 
 List of Variables in the Equation 
 
       Var1            LN(WSSE/WSSE<1>)-LN(PGDP/PGDP<1>)                      
       Var2            LN(GDPV/ET)-LN(GDPV<1>/ET<1>)                          
       ECWE            Error correction term, wage share lag 1  
       D91             DUMMY 1991=1, German reunification                     
       Var3            T96*UR<1>                                        
       UR              unemployment rate euroland oecd                        
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
 
Time Range for Estimation:  1970    – 1998    
 
 ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  Var1                            I R2  0.932 I R2C  0.917 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I Var2                          I    0.38310 I   0.10799 I  3.55 I 16.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I ECWE                          I   -0.17145 I   0.03172 I  5.41 I 20.7 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I D91                           I   -0.02735 I   0.00859 I  3.19 I 14.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I Var3                          I   -0.00029 I   0.00009 I  1.81 I  6.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I UR<1>                         I   -0.00419 I   0.00037 I 11.30 I 41.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I CONST                         I   -0.85167 I   0.16436 I  5.18 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.00568  I  MAPE     37.54  I            I DW  1.676 I RHO(1)  0.09 
 ============================================================================ 
 
Finally, we use the error correction model to derive the target share of wages in nominal out-
put for given rates of unemployment as implied by a wage-determination process as 
described in Table 5. Note that the long-run relation between the share of wages and unem-
ployment reads as follows: 
(4)  w – p – pr = - 4.919556 – 0.03192 ur 
where w denotes gross wages per worker, p are output prices, pr is labour productivity (all 
variables in logs) and ur is the rate of unemployment. Thus, for any given rate of unemploy-
ment, the target share of wages can be calculated and compared to the actual value of the 
wage share. The results of this exercise are given in Table 7.  
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Table 7: Actual and Target Wage Shares in Nominal Output 
 =============================================== 
 I         I  ACTUAL   I   ACTUAL  I  TARGET   I 
 I  YEAR   I WAGE SHAREIUNEMPLOYMENT WAGE SHAREI 
 I         I           I           I           I 
 =============================================== 
 I  1970   I    51.839 I     2.200 I    68.072 I  
 I  1971   I    52.609 I     2.300 I    67.855 I  
 I  1972   I    52.704 I     2.600 I    67.208 I  
 I  1973   I    53.330 I     2.600 I    67.208 I  
 I  1974   I    54.636 I     2.800 I    66.780 I  
 I  1975   I    56.621 I     4.000 I    64.271 I  
 I  1976   I    56.489 I     4.400 I    63.455 I  
 I  1977   I    56.564 I     4.800 I    62.650 I  
 I  1978   I    56.222 I     5.100 I    62.053 I  
 I  1979   I    56.230 I     5.300 I    61.658 I  
 I  1980   I    56.517 I     5.700 I    60.876 I  
 I  1981   I    56.631 I     7.000 I    58.402 I  
 I  1982   I    56.342 I     8.300 I    56.028 I  
 I  1983   I    55.958 I     9.400 I    54.095 I  
 I  1984   I    55.073 I    10.200 I    52.731 I  
 I  1985   I    54.568 I    10.400 I    52.395 I  
 I  1986   I    53.787 I    10.500 I    52.228 I  
 I  1987   I    53.500 I    10.500 I    52.228 I  
 I  1988   I    52.483 I    10.100 I    52.899 I  
 I  1989   I    51.595 I     9.300 I    54.268 I  
 I  1990   I    51.316 I     8.600 I    55.494 I  
 I  1991   I    51.733 I     8.700 I    55.317 I  
 I  1992   I    52.021 I     9.600 I    53.750 I  
 I  1993   I    52.475 I    11.300 I    50.911 I  
 I  1994   I    51.219 I    12.200 I    49.470 I  
 I  1995   I    50.934 I    11.900 I    49.946 I  
 I  1996   I    50.344 I    12.300 I    49.312 I  
 I  1997   I    49.621 I    12.400 I    49.155 I  
 I  1998   I    48.823 I    11.700 I    50.266 I  
 ======================================== 
The basic and, unfortunately, quite unpleasant message from the above table is that the 
target share of wages as implied by our model of the wage-bargaining process comes very 
close to observed values in the past two years, despite a two-digit level of unemployment. 
Thus, we may well see no further wage moderating impact from unemployment these days, 
suggesting, of course, the existence of a serious insider-outsider problem in Euroland’s 
labour market. 
It may be interesting to note that the above interpretation sits quite well with the empirical 
observation that real unit labour cost have fallen by almost 15 per cent since the beginning of 
the 1980s. It also shows that the traditional wage gap analysis, which is still quite frequently 
used to allocate an increase in unemployment between structural and Keynesian factors, 
may be seriously misleading. If high unemployment persists in spite of a, say, zero wage gap, 
then the implication is often drawn that expansionary demand management policies are 
called for. This, however, is poor economic reasoning since movements in actual wage 
shares tell us little to nothing about the underlying equilibrium relationship between the labour 
share and the capital-output ratio (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1998). 
Obviously, the role of a host of other factors relevant for the wage determination process 
remains to be carefully investigated. However, conforming to almost conventional wisdom 
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nowadays, the following characteristics of wage behaviour in Euroland have emerged from 
the above rough analysis: 
· In the (very) long run real wages are highly sensitive to unemployment, probably more so 
than in the US. In the short run, however, there appears to be a relatively high degree of 
real wage rigidity in Euroland. 
· The speed of real wage adjustment to shocks is very slow, with more than 4 years 
required to achieve half of the adjustment. 
· The target wage share as implied by the wage-bargaining process comes at present quite 
close to its actual value, despite a two-digit level of unemployment, suggesting a serious 
insider/outsider problem in wage determination. 
· It turns out to be quite difficult, if not almost impossible, to detect any significant changes 
in the wage-setting behaviour in the 1990s.  
III.3 The Cyclical Behaviour of Unemployment and Okun's Law in Euroland 
This section takes a quick look at the cyclical behaviour of the overall unemployment rate in 
the euro area. The analytical tool used is known as Okun’s law describing the relation 
between the cyclical component of unemployment and the deviation of actual output from 
potential. 
Both, the output gap and the cyclical component of unemployment are analytical concepts 
and, thus, not directly observable. Thus, turning now to the econometric specification, con-
sider the following variant of Okun’s law 
(5)  ur – ur*  =  -µ ( y – y* ) 
where ur denotes the actual rate of unemployment, ur* is the (unobserved) rate of structural 
unemployment and (y-y*) is a measure of the output gap. The Okun coefficient µ charac-
terises the transmission of cyclical fluctuations in output into cyclical variations in the unem-
ployment rate. 
Assuming that structural unemployment has remained constant over time would lead to the 
following straightforward estimation of (5): 
(6)  urt   =  const - µ ( y – y* )t  +  et 
However, given that structural unemployment in the euro area cannot plausibly be depicted 
as constant over time, a flexible specification for the time path of ur* is used. We allow in our 
test different trough-to-trough polynomial trends in structural unemployment with the order of 
polynomials, when necessary, running up to three.  
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The estimation equation in its general form then reads as 
(7)  urt   =  const  +  p1i Ti   +  p2iTi
2 +  p3iTi
3  -  µ ( y – y* )t  +  et 
where the trough-to-trough time trends Ti   run from 1975 to 1983, 1984 to 1993 and from 
1994 to 1998, respectively. 
Finally, for a rough check on parameter stability over time, we also estimate the Okun relation 
over the restricted time period of the past ten years, i.e. 1989 to 1998 and, alternatively, we 
allow for a trend increase in the Okun coefficient in the past decade.  
The estimation results are presented in Tables 8 to 10. Table 8 shows the results of the OLS 
estimation of equation (7) over the period 1973 to 1998 in the more parsimonious 
specification where insignificant terms have been removed from the equation. 
Table 8: Okun's Law (OLS) 
Piecewise Trends trough-to trough  
Linear Trend                75-83 
Linear, Quadratic and Cubic 84-93 
Linear and Quadratic        94-98 
  List of Variables in the Equation 
       UR            Unemployment rate Euroland OECD  
        T7583         Trend 73-83                      
        T8493         Trend 84-93                      
        T94           Trend from 1994                  
        CONST         CONSTANT TERM                    
 Time Range for Estimation:  1973 – 1998    
============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  UR                              I R2  0.996 I R2C  0.994 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I GDPGAP                        I   -0.32292 I   0.05048 I  6.40 I  1.7 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I T7583                         I    0.58934 I   0.02514 I 23.45 I  6.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I T8493                         I    1.35720 I   0.18593 I  7.30 I 18.6 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I T8493**2                      I   -0.30818 I   0.05395 I  5.71 I 41.8 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I T8493**3                      I    0.01958 I   0.00378 I  5.18 I 26.5 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I T94                           I    0.72719 I   0.19698 I  3.69 I  3.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B7 I T94**2                        I   -0.12168 I   0.03866 I  3.15 I  2.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B8 I CONST                         I    3.08203 I   0.13316 I 23.14 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.24450  I  MAPE      2.48  I            I DW  1.962 I RHO(1)  0.00 
 ============================================================================ 
The Okun coefficient µ is estimated at 0.32 according to the specification in Table 8. This 
result would suggest that, roughly speaking, a negative output gap of 1 per cent has driven 
up unemployment in Euroland, on average, by about 1/3 of a percentage point. Thus, the 
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cyclicality of unemployment does not seem to have been very pronounced in Euroland. For 
the US, in comparison, a textbook value for this coefficient would typically put it at 0.5. 
It remains to be tested, however, whether this behavioural regularity can also be validated for 
the more recent past. Thus, for a rough test on behavioural stability over time, the Okun rela-
tion has also been estimated for the restricted time period of the past ten years, i.e. 1989 to 
1998. The results of this exercise are depicted in Table 9. 
Table 9: Okun's Law 1989–1998 
         UR              Unemployment rate Euroland OECD                        
         GDPGAP          output gap Euroland OECD                               
         CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
 
         Time Range for Estimation:  1989    – 1998    
 
 ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  UR                              I R2  0.941 I R2C  0.933 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I GDPGAP                        I   -0.84531 I   0.07504 I 11.26 I100.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I CONST                         I   10.56331 I   0.12937 I 81.65 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.40367  I  MAPE      2.23  I            I DW  2.116 I RHO(1) -0.06 
 ============================================================================ 
 
There are two points worth noting from the above table. First, it turns out that over the period 
from 1989 to 1998 the Okun relation can be satisfactorily described without the help of time 
trends approximating the evolution of structural unemployment. Thus, for the past ten years 
the movement of unemployment may well be characterised as cyclical swings around a more 
or less constant (and high) structural rate. Secondly, the Okun coefficient is estimated to 
have been much higher in the most recent business cycle; taken at face value, the estimate 
would suggest that over the past ten years cyclical fluctuations in output have been translated 
almost one to one into cyclical swings in unemployment. A very similar picture emerges from 
an alternative estimation strategy allowing for a trend increase in the (absolute) value of the 
Okun coefficient starting from 1989 onwards. The results of such an exercise (reported in 
Table 10) do indeed confirm the observation that over the past ten years unemployment 
cyclicality has significantly increased in Euroland. 
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Table 10: Okun's Law: Alternative Specification  
UR              Unemployment rate Euroland OECD                        
       GDPGAP          output gap Euroland OECD                               
       Var1            T89*GDPGAP                                             
       T7583           Trend 73-83                                            
       T8493           Trend 84-93                                            
       CONST           CONSTANT TERM                                          
   
         Time Range for Estimation:  1973    – 1998    
   
   ============================================================================ 
  Dep. Variable:  UR                              I R2  0.994 I R2C  0.992 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Nr.I Independent Variables         I Est. Coeff.I St. Dev.  I   t   I BC % 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B1 I GDPGAP                        I   -0.30928 I   0.05718 I  5.41 I  1.9 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B2 I Var1                          I   -0.06572 I   0.02446 I  2.69 I  1.5 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B3 I T7583                         I    0.59633 I   0.02868 I 20.79 I  7.4 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B4 I T8493                         I    1.21705 I   0.23193 I  5.25 I 20.3 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B5 I T8493**2                      I   -0.25790 I   0.07073 I  3.65 I 42.6 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B6 I T8493**3                      I    0.01587 I   0.00512 I  3.10 I 26.2 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
  B7 I CONST                         I    3.05800 I   0.15101 I 20.25 I  0.0 
     I                               I            I           I       I 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SE     0.27655  I  MAPE      2.59  I            I DW  2.240 I RHO(1) -0.16 
 ============================================================================ 
 
Fitted time trends to capture the movements in structural unemployment are indicative of a 
straightforward linear increase in structural unemployment over the period 1975 to 1983 from 
a starting value of about 3 per cent to close to 9 per cent at the cyclical trough in 1983; from 
1984 onwards the estimate for structural unemployment in Euroland hovers around in the 9-
10 per cent range until the next cyclical trough in 1993, with some tendency to reflect 
movements in actual unemployment to a small extent and with a lag of one to two years. A 
very similar pattern is to be observed in the years from 1993 onwards with structural 
unemployment creeping up by another percentage point before starting to decrease 
somewhat in the recent past. Nevertheless, these estimates would suggest that around 90 
per cent of current unemployment in Euroland are of a non-cyclical nature. 
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Table 11: Unemployment and Its Cyclical Component in Euroland 
 =============================================== 
 I         I Unemploy- I StructuralI Estimated I 
 I  YEAR   I ment rate I   Rate    I  Cyclical I 
 I         I Euroland  I  Estimate I Component I 
 I         I  OECD     I           I           I 
 =============================================== 
 I         I           I           I           I 
 I  1973   I     2.600 I     3.249 I    -0.649 I  
 I  1974   I     2.800 I     3.233 I    -0.433 I  
 I  1975   I     4.000 I     3.320 I     0.680 I  
 I  1976   I     4.400 I     4.400 I     0.000 I  
 I  1977   I     4.800 I     4.893 I    -0.093 I  
 I  1978   I     5.100 I     5.409 I    -0.309 I  
 I  1979   I     5.300 I     6.011 I    -0.711 I  
 I  1980   I     5.700 I     6.257 I    -0.557 I  
 I  1981   I     7.000 I     6.938 I     0.062 I  
 I  1982   I     8.300 I     7.898 I     0.402 I  
 I  1983   I     9.400 I     8.781 I     0.619 I  
 I  1984   I    10.200 I     9.612 I     0.588 I  
 I  1985   I    10.400 I     9.874 I     0.526 I  
 I  1986   I    10.500 I    10.067 I     0.433 I  
 I  1987   I    10.500 I    10.129 I     0.371 I  
 I  1988   I    10.100 I    10.224 I    -0.124 I  
 I  1989   I     9.300 I     9.900 I    -0.600 I  
 I  1990   I     8.600 I     9.658 I    -1.058 I  
 I  1991   I     8.700 I     9.713 I    -1.013 I  
 I  1992   I     9.600 I    10.172 I    -0.572 I  
 I  1993   I    11.300 I    10.024 I     1.276 I  
 I  1994   I    12.200 I    11.145 I     1.055 I  
 I  1995   I    11.900 I    10.823 I     1.077 I  
 I  1996   I    12.300 I    10.713 I     1.587 I  
 I  1997   I    12.400 I    10.869 I     1.531 I  
 I  1998   I    11.700 I    10.444 I     1.256 I  
 I         I           I           I           I 
 =============================================== 
 
Clearly, the above decomposition of unemployment into its cyclical and non-cyclical compo-
nent should not be taken at face value given the reduced-form approach taken. It does offer, 
though, another piece of evidence for the stylised observation that over the past 25 years 
unemployment in Euroland has moved more from business cycle to business cycle than 
within the cycles.  
 It should be noted, however, that this methodology and estimation strategy tends, almost by 
definition, to force the time path of structural unemployment quite close to actual unemploy-
ment. This can easily be seen from equation (5), since for an (expected) value of µ between 
zero and one the cyclical component of unemployment can never exceed the (absolute) 
value of the output gap. And, of course, approximating the evolution of ur* over time with the 
help of polynomial trends does not give any clue on the underlying causes of movements in 
structural unemployment. Despite these obvious shortcomings, though, a sensible empirical 
estimate of the parameter µ may be regarded as a useful stylised fact concerning the cyclical 
behaviour of unemployment in Euroland. 
The Okun relation is, of course, a reduced-form type equation at a highly aggregated level. 
Cyclical variations in unemployment are ultimately the end result of the dynamic interaction of 
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the inflow and outflow of employment, unemployment and non-participation in the labour 
market. From a purely mechanistic standpoint, the extent of cyclical fluctuations in produc-
tion, the reaction of employment demand to output fluctuations and the cyclical variability of 
the labour supply operate simultaneously. After all, the cyclical sensitivity of real wages also 
curbs fluctuations in output and employment. In what follows we start an investigation into 
these different dynamic processes by taking a first look at the responsiveness of employment 
to cyclical fluctuations in output and the cyclical volatility of the labour force.  
Table 12: The Cyclical Responsiveness of Euroland's Labour Market(s) 
Employment to GDP1        Labour Force to Employment2 Okun's - µ 3 
    69-89  89-98  69-89    89-98           69-89     89-98 
 
AUSTRIA    0.37    0.56    0.80     0.96  0.06 0.02 
BELGIUM    0.45    0.73      -    -0.12  0.45 0.82 
FRANCE    0.38    0.58    0.21     0.07  0.30 0.54 
GERMANY    0.53    0.86    0.42     0.46  0.31 0.46 
IRELAND    0.63    0.56    0.35     0.28  0.41 0.40 
ITALY     0.15    0.56    0.63     0.34  0.06 0.37 
NETHERLANDS   0.48    0.84    0.12     0.11  0.42 0.75 
PORTUGAL -  0.13    0.88    1.22     0.67    - 0.29 
FINLAND    0.35    0.76    0.31     0.24  0.24 0.58 
SPAIN     0.74    0.22    1.45     0.10     - 0.20 
LUXEMBOURG   0.08  - 0.09    0.44     0.33  0.05    -   
EUROLAND    0.43    0.97    0.18     0.26  0.35 0.72 
USA     0.59    0.67    0.27     0.27  0.43 0.49 
 
 
1 Estimated coefficient in a regression of the deviations of employment from trend on the deviation of GDP from 
trend, where the trends have been established by the Hodrick-Prescott filter imposing identical smoothing factors 
for employment and GDP in all countries. 
2 Estimated coefficient in a regression of the trend deviation in the labour force on the trend deviation of employ-
ment, where the trends have been established by the Hodrick-Prescott filter imposing identical smoothing factors 
for employment and the labour force in all countries. 
3  Estimated Okun coefficients as implied by the cyclical responsiveness of employment to GDP (1) and the cyclical 
responsiveness of the labour force to employment (2); calculated as (1) times [1 - (2)]. 
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The results in Table 12 suggest that in the 1990s unemployment cyclicality has been higher in 
Euroland than in the US, while the opposite was true in the previous two decades. The main 
reason for this is apparently to be found in Euroland's employment now responding much 
stronger to cyclical fluctuations in output than in the past, and even somewhat stronger than 
in the US. This holds true for almost all of the individual euro-11 countries. Given that the 
higher employment responsiveness has not been triggered by less flexible wage adjustment 
mechanisms, it may be reasonably concluded that labour market reforms in the 1990s have 
been successful insofar as rigidities with respect to employment decisions were apparently 
greatly reduced. Thus, in consequence, it appears rather implausible that too strict 
employment protection regulations, in general, can still offer a convincing explanation for a 
significant part of Euroland's problem of persistently high unemployment. However, the rising 
incidence of atypical jobs, in particular among certain ("non-core") groups of the workforce 
such as the youth and prime-age women, suggests that the apparent increase in overall 
employment flexibility may also reflect a much stronger segmentation of the labour market. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has attempted to establish a few stylised facts about Euroland's labour market 
given the even increased importance of smoothly functioning markets in a monetary union. 
The econometric evidence assembled can be summarised as follows: 
· The real wage elasticity of labour demand is estimated at between –0.3 to –0.4; thus, a 
one per cent decrease in real product wages increases, ceteris paribus, employment 
demand by 0.3–0.4 per cent. Thus, there is room for capital-labour substitution at given 
output. 
· The speed of employment adjustment has apparently increased in the past decade to 
around 80 per cent adjustment being achieved in one year, up by some 25 percentage 
points from its average value over the past three decades.  
· Autonomous technical progress is estimated to have averaged 1.2–1.3 per cent per year 
in the period since 1975, a value which falls significantly short of the trend growth rate of 
actual labour productivity amounting to 1.8 per cent in this time span. 
· In the (very) long-run, real wages are highly sensitive to unemployment, probably more so 
than in the US. In the short run, however, there appears to be a relatively high degree of 
real wage rigidity in Euroland. 
· The speed of real wage adjustment to shocks is very slow, with more than 4 years re-
quired to achieve half of the adjustment. 
· The target wage share as implied by the wage bargaining process comes at present quite 
close to its actual value, despite a two-digit level of unemployment, suggesting a serious 
insider/outsider problem in wage determination. 
· It turns out to be quite difficult, if not almost impossible, to detect any significant changes 
in the wage-setting behaviour in the 1990s. 
· Over the period 1989 to 1998 the movement of unemployment may well be characterised 
as cyclical swings around a more or less constant (and high) structural rate. Around 90 
per cent of current unemployment in Euroland is estimated to be of a non-cyclical nature. 
· In the 1990s, unemployment cyclicality has been higher in Euroland than in the US, while 
the opposite was true in the previous two decades. The main reason for this is apparently 
to be found in Euroland's employment now responding much stronger to cyclical fluctua-
tions in output than in the past, and even somewhat stronger than in the US. 
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Given that the higher employment responsiveness has not been triggered by less flexible 
wage adjustment mechanisms, it may be reasonably concluded that labour market reforms in 
the 1990s have been successful insofar as rigidities with respect to employment decisions 
were apparently greatly reduced. Thus, in consequence, it appears rather implausible that too 
strict employment protection regulations can still offer a convincing explanation for a sig-
nificant part of Euroland's problem of persistently high unemployment. However, employment 
protection regulations may change the composition of the unemployment pool with respect to 
the duration by reducing the rate of flow into and out of unemployment (Nickell and Layard 
1997). The apparent increase in overall employment flexibility may also reflect a much 
stronger segmentation of the labour market. Indeed, in a number of EU countries regulations 
on employment contracts have been significantly eased, in particular on so-called "atypical" 
employment contracts such as part-time jobs and temporary work (OECD 1999b). Thus, with 
sustained strict employment protection regulation on regular contracts, there have been addi-
tional incentives to switch from permanent contracts to more flexible work arrangements. 
While this may have helped to achieve the required workforce flexibility in otherwise still fairly 
rigid labour markets, it may have also led to a more segmented labour market in which those 
with permanent contracts benefit both from employment protection legislation and from 
increased bargaining power by virtue of a growing number of workers in "atypical" forms of 
employment. Thus, there can be little doubt that wage bargaining in Euroland continues to 
suffer from a serious insider-outsider problem. 
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